A novel method for safety analysis of Cyber-Physical Systems - Application to a ship exhaust gas scrubber system by Bolbot, Victor et al.
safety
Article
A Novel Method for Safety Analysis of
Cyber-Physical Systems—Application to a Ship
Exhaust Gas Scrubber System
Victor Bolbot 1,*, Gerasimos Theotokatos 1 , Evangelos Boulougouris 1, George Psarros 2
and Rainer Hamann 3
1 Maritime Safety Research Centre, Department of Naval Architecture, Ocean and Marine Engineering,
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow G4 0LZ, UK; gerasimos.theotokatos@strath.ac.uk (G.T.);
evangelos.boulougouris@strath.ac.uk (E.B.)
2 DNV GL Group Technology & Research, Maritime Transport, DNV GL AS, 1363 Høvik, Norway;
George.Psarros@dnvgl.com
3 DNV GL Regulatory affairs, DNV GL SE, 20457 Hamburg, Germany; rainer.hamann@dnvgl.com
* Correspondence: victor.bolbot@strath.ac.uk
Received: 21 February 2020; Accepted: 12 May 2020; Published: 19 May 2020


Abstract: Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) represent a systems category developed and promoted
in the maritime industry to automate functions and system operations. In this study, a novel
Combinatorial Approach for Safety Analysis is presented, which addresses the traditional safety
methods’ limitations by integrating System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Events Sequence
Identification (ETI) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). The developed method results in the development
of a detailed Fault Tree that captures the effects of both the physical components/subsystems and the
software functions’ failures. The quantitative step of the method employs the components’ failure
rates to calculate the top event failure rate along with importance metrics for identifying the most
critical components/functions. This method is implemented for an exhaust gas open loop scrubber
system safety analysis to estimate its failure rate and identify critical failures considering the baseline
system configuration as well as various alternatives with advanced functions for monitoring and
diagnostics. The results demonstrate that configurations with SOx sensor continuous monitoring
or scrubber unit failure diagnosis/prognosis lead to significantly lower failure rate. Based on the
analysis results, the advantages/disadvantages of the novel method are also discussed. This study
also provides insights for better safety analysis of the CPSs.
Keywords: cyber-physical systems; system-theoretic process analysis; events sequence identification;
fault tree analysis; exhaust gas open loop scrubber system
1. Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) represent a class of systems advancing in a number of application
areas including the maritime industry [1]. The CPSs are expected to increase the productivity and
safety levels by removing, substituting [2] and/or supporting the operator in the decision-making
process, thus reducing the number of human errors leading to accidents [3]. Typical examples of the
CPSs include the Industrial and automation Control Systems (ICS), robots, and Cyber-Physical Systems
of Systems [4]. Examples of marine CPSs include the Power Management System, Propulsion engines,
Heat Ventilation Air Conditioning systems and autonomous ships whose functions are supported by
the CPSs [1].
Whilst CPSs are expected to bring significant benefits, they are considered to be complex, which
implies that they may behave unpredictably [4–6]. Their complexity can be attributed to a number of
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CPS properties [7], including their software-intensive character [8], ability to dynamically reconfigure
and make decisions autonomously [4], interconnectivity [9], heterogeneity [10], interactions with
humans [11] and associated management system [12,13]. In addition, the tight interactions between
the CPS components, especially between the cyber and the physical parts allow for little slack in their
performance [4,6]. These attributes of the CPSs render them prone to accidents or malfunction [4,6,7].
A potential accident might have significant safety and financial consequences, such as in cases of the
Boeing 737-8 (MAX) accident [14] or the blackout on a Viking Sky cruise ship [15].
The potential hazards that can arise in a system are identified by employing a hazard identification
and safety analysis methods and are controlled during the system design phase [4]. A number of
traditional methods are employed for the CPS hazard identification and analysis, namely Preliminary
Hazard Analysis (PHA), HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [4]. Model-based approaches can be also exploited, such as
presented in [10]. In a number of studies [16–19], however, the use of PHA, HAZOP, FMEA and
FTA for CPS safety analysis was criticised, as these methods cannot support the analyst in properly
capturing the interactions between the system components, especially the interactions between the
control components and the physical components, thus not identifying software-related hazardous
scenarios. Similar criticism applies to the model-based study presented in [10] as the model is primarily
based on the localized version of FMEA.
The System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) has been proved capable of identifying the potential
hazardous control actions by capturing the context of the system as well as identifying additional
software related hazardous scenarios not captured by FMEA [17–19]. Although the STPA sufficiently
addresses the software-intensive character of CPSs, it overlooks the events’ sequences [20]. The specific
hazardous control actions are identified at different time snapshots of the system operation, but the
STPA does not address how these hazardous control actions are propagated into an accident, incidents,
or hazards [21]. Therefore, STPA alone cannot tackle properly CPS dynamic reconfigurations functions
in safety analysis. This is of practical interest for the ICS, where the undesired event will happen
due to a combination of failures occurring at different time periods and thus the system dynamic
reconfiguration is highly important [4]. This method was proved weaker in supporting the single
cause failures identification despite its capabilities and potential [18]. In addition, the STPA can be
implemented only on a qualitative level, not allowing the criticality and sensitivity assessment, which
are required for the system safety-efficient design [22]. Moreover, it is applied at a functional level, thus
not considering the actual system design architecture [19]. The STPA is a manual method and, despite
the specific rules that govern its implementation, it is still considered to be subjective [4]. Therefore, its
enhancement, improvement or combination with other methods are required for addressing the above
discussed limitations.
A number of previously published studies were dedicated to supplement the safety engineers
implementing the STPA, either via the use of context tables [17], or finite state machines [21,23,24] or
combining it with other modelling languages [25,26]. Wang et al. [27] and Liu et al. [28] focused on the
STPA automation based on formal system models. In another group of studies, the STPA was combined
with other hazard identification and analysis methods, such as FMEA and the Systematic Human Error
Reduction and Prediction Analysis [29], FTA [30,31], Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) [32], or with
stochastic Petri Nets [20]. STPA has been also used to derive test requirements for CPSs [33]. A number
of studies applied approximate ranking to scenarios derived using STPA [34–38].
Although the previous research studies proposed solutions to address some of the STPA
implementation problems, a number of shortfalls still exists. Whilst the context tables [17] and
the finite state machines [21,23] can provide a broader system context, in which the Unsafe Control
Actions (UCAs) can be generated, the actual sequence of UCAs is ignored. In [26], although the
actual system architecture was captured, all the other challenges (incorporation of the CPSs dynamic
reconfiguration functions, quantitative safety analysis, manual character of STPA) were not addressed.
The use of the Unified Modelling Language notations [25] considered the events sequence only for
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the STPA purposes. Wang et al. [27] identified the causal factors for each UCA were retrieved in
an automated way, but the UCAs were identified manually. In [28], the sequences of UCAs leading
to hazards were identified in an automated way, but quantitative safety analysis was not pursued.
In [27,28], a sociotechnical system safety was investigated; however, further analysis of the physical
failures and consideration of the actual system architecture was not considered. In [29], a deeper
understanding of health care system hazards was obtained, but without implementing a quantitative
risk analysis. In [30,31], the STPA was used to enhance a Fault Tree, which only implicitly considered
the events sequence that would occur in the system, thus not addressing the system reconfiguration
functions. The identification of a potential event sequences was not addressed in [32] and the
analysis remained at a qualitative level. Whilst the temporal relations of the investigated system
were incorporated in [20], no importance analysis was implemented due to computational limitations.
The STPA results ranking was applied based on an approximate estimation of the considered safety
metrics [34,36–38], whilst the study in [35] did not consider the system interactions in detail.
The preceding discussion reveals a number of research gaps in the literature, in specific: (a) the
integration of the STPA with other methods to depict how the identified UCAs propagate into hazards
using more structured formalism has not been pursued; (b) the adoption of the STPA for quantitative
safety analysis purposes has not been fully addressed in the previous research studies; and (c) the lack
of an automated STPA based on the investigated system model representation applicable to complex
technical systems.
In this respect, the present study aims at developing a new, more effective and inclusive safety
analysis method for the CPSs, with focus on ICS, which supports the implementation of quantitative
safety analysis. The novel method is applied to an open loop exhaust gas scrubber system. The open
loop exhaust gases’ scrubber systems use has become popular due to recent regulatory restrictions
on SOx emissions from ships [39]. Exhaust gas open-loop scrubber system is not a safety critical
system but still has an important industrial interest and as every system has inherent hazards. Open
loop exhaust gas scrubber can be considered as a simple example of an ICS system, which is used
for reducing the SOx emissions from ships engines. Its failure can lead to noncompliance with SOx
emissions’ regulations which in turn may lead to SOx emissions deteriorating the air quality in the local
area with negative effects on human health [40] and the environment as SOx emissions contribute to
acid rains [41]. In addition, noncompliance with the SOx emissions regulations can result in significant
financial sanctions against the ship owner/operator. The exhaust gas scrubbers’ safety issues analysis
reported in [42,43], whereas, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, other studies are not available in
the pertinent literature.
The original contribution of the present work includes: (a) a cross-fertilisation of the STPA, the
Event Sequence Identification (ESI) method and the FTA to develop a “Combinatorial Approach for
Safety Analysis” (CASA); (b) the quantitative estimation of the failure rate for noncompliance with
SOx emission regulations for an open-loop exhaust gases scrubber system.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. In Section 2, the developed method and its
rationale are presented. Section 3 includes the system and analysis input description. In Section 4,
the investigated system results are provided and relevant safety recommendations and method
advantages/disadvantages are discussed. In the conclusions section, the main findings are summarised
and some practical considerations for the method implementation are provided.
2. CASA Method Rationale and Description
As the literature review demonstrated, there is a need for a novel safety analysis method
development to address the limitations of the existing approaches. In this study, the integration of three
hazard identification methods (STPA, ETA and FTA) is proposed to support the CPSs safety analysis.
The STPA method is appropriate for identifying new interactions between the CPSs control and physical
parts, sufficiently capturing the CPSs software-effective character [17–19]. Furthermore, the STPA has
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the potential to identify the harmful effects of successful cyberattacks on CPSs [44]. However, the STPA
needs enhancement with the inclusion of a quantitative step to support the decision-making process.
On the other hand, FTA is effective for capturing the dependencies between components and
analysing the physical failures [45]. Potentially, FTA could be substituted using other methods;
however, FTA is rather simple to be applied. In addition, the ETA exhibits strength in identifying the
event sequences of the investigated system and identifying multi-point failures [46]. This is important
in CPSs, as CPSs have the ability to reconfigure responding to specific fault or control commands.
Potentially, Event Sequence Diagrams as reported in [47] could be used, but the ETA based method
was selected herein, due to its formalism simplicity.
Hence, integrating these three methods and a quantitative approach to form a novel method is
expected to improve the analysis rigour, through increasing the number of identified complex scenarios,
capturing the dependencies between different component failures, more effectively capturing the
software related failures and identifying the temporal relationship between different events in the
system. In addition, it allows for the quantification of appropriate safety and criticality/importance
analysis metrics, thus facilitating the generation of safety recommendations and enhancement processes.
The preceding considerations led to the development of the proposed method, known as
“Combinatorial Approach for Safety Analysis” (CASA), which consists of ten steps. Whilst some of
the method steps were presented in [48], they are elaborated and enhanced further in this study by
including the quantitative part description and delineating the method steps. The method phases and
steps are provided in Figure 1, whereas the steps’ characteristics are summarised in Table 1.
Safety 2020, 7, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 30 
4 
On the other hand, FTA is effective for capturing the dependencies bet e  c ts d 
nalysing the physical failures [45]. Potenti ll , F  coul  be su st   r thods; 
how ver, FTA is rather simple to be a plied. In a dition, the ETA exhibits stre t  i  i tif i  t e 
event sequences of the investigated system and identifying multi-point fail res [46]. is is i ortant 
in CPSs, as CPSs have the ability to reconfigure responding to specific fault or control co ands. 
Potentially, Event Sequence Diagrams as reported in [47] could be used, but the ETA based method 
was selected herein, due to its formalism simplicity. 
Hence, integrating these three methods and a quantitative approach to form a novel method is 
expected to improve the analysis rigour, through increasing the number of identified complex 
scenarios, capturing the dependencies between different component failures, more effectively 
capturing the software related failures and identifying the temporal relationship between different 
events in the system. In addition, it allows for the quantification of appropriate safety and 
criticality/importance analysis metrics, thus facilitating the generation of safety recommendations and 
enhancement processes. 
The preceding considerations led to the development of the proposed method, known as 
“Combinatorial Approach for Safety Analysis” (CASA), which consists of ten steps. Whilst some of the 
method steps were presented in [48], they are elaborated and enhanced further in this study by 
including the quantitative part description and delineating the method steps. The ethod phases and 
steps are provided in Figure 1, whereas the steps’ c r t ri ti  re su arised in Table 1. 
 
Figure 1. CASA method flowchart. 
Figure 1. CASA method flowchart.
Safety 2020, 6, 26 5 of 31
Table 1. CASA method steps overview.
Steps Step Description Employed Technique Justification Required Resources Output Output to Steps
Initiation Step 0:Preparation
Accumulating system data:
accidents investigations reports,
previous hazards analyses,
components failure rates, system
simulations, etc.
Publications and
accident investigation
reports analysis
Good understanding
of system problems
required for analysis
Access to data Good understanding ofthe system All other steps
STPA
Step 1: Defining
the scope of
analysis
Identification/selection of
accident, system hazards, sub
hazards and safety constraints for
the system
Hazard
review/Brainstorming
Setting the boundaries
of analysis
Good understanding of
the system, potentially
team of experts
List of accidents, hazards
and safety constraints,
hierarchical control
structure
Steps 2, 3, 5
Step 2:
Hierarchical
control structure
Development of the system
control structure
Following the STPA
guidelines
Developing system
model for the STPA
Access to the manuals
and the drawings
Hierarchical control
structure Steps 3, 4
Step 3: UCAs
identification UCAs are identified
Following the STPA
guidelines
To identify control
failures
List of the control
actions and the context
variables
List of UCAs in tabular
format Steps 4, 5 and 9
Step 4: Causal
factors analysis
For each of the UCAs causal
factors are identified
Using a developed
checklist
Identification of the
causal factors for the
UCAs
List of the UCAs, control
structure, checklist
List of the causal factors
for the UCAs Step 7
ESI Step 5: Developingevent sequences
ESI using hazards/sub hazards as
Initiating Events following logic
similar to Event Tree Analysis
ESI Connecting UCAs, subhazards and hazards
List of the hazards,
safety constraints and
UCAs
ESI results for each of the
hazards Step 6
Integration of STPA and
ESI results
Step 6: Synthesis
of ESI results Unification of the ESI results
Applying a number of
logic rules
To connect different
ESI results
ESI results from the
previous step Combined Fault Tree Step 7
Step 7: Populating
the Fault Tree
Enriching the Fault Tree with
results of the STPA Manually
Connecting the UCAs,
hazards and accidents
Results of STPA and
initial Fault Tree More detailed Fault Tree Step 8
Step 8: Refinement Refinement of already developedFault Tree
Applying a number of
logic rules
Correcting
inconsistencies
Fault Tree from the
previous step Refined Fault Tree Step 9
FTA Step 9: Fault TreeAnalysis Fault Tree Analysis Fault Tree Analysis
Analysis of the
physical failures
Access to the manuals
and the drawings Final Fault Tree Step 10
QA
Step 10:
Quantitative
analysis
Estimation of the frequency of the
top event, criticality analysis,
importance analysis, etc.
Fault Tree and
equations calculations
Critical components
identification and
performance
prediction
Failure rates,
operational data,
inspection and
maintenance intervals
Safety recommendations Risk estimation
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The first four steps (steps 1–4) are similar to the steps of the STPA method. In step 5, the ESI
method is employed to develop the “Event Trees” by analysing the system and using the STPA results,
thus obtaining insight into the system temporal behaviour and potential complex failures. Step 6
employs the developed “Event Trees” and synthesizes/transforms them into one Fault Tree. In step
7, the generated Fault Tree is populated with the results from the STPA. In step 8, this Fault Tree
is further refined to address inconsistencies due to the integration of STPA and ESI results. Step 9
expands on some physical failures identified by STPA (nodes of step 8 Fault Tree) by using the FTA to
develop the final Fault Tree. Step 10 includes the quantitative analysis that is needed for calculating
the top event failure rate for the investigated system, as well as the importance analysis that provides
metrics for the critical system components and failures. The CASA results are used to derive the
safety recommendations for the system safety enhancement. The method steps have to be applied in a
specified sequence; otherwise, the results will differentiate from CASA results.
2.1. Preparatory Step (Step 0)
This step involves the activities required to gather the information about the system and system
hazards. This includes, if available, the system simulations using detailed models depicting the
system behaviour and responses, previous hazard identification analyses, the study of the system
operation and maintenance manuals, development and analysis of system experts’ questionnaires and
the analysis of previous accident investigation reports, as well as getting access to the failure rates
databases for the system components.
2.2. STPA (Steps 1–4)
Step 1 (Figure 1) aims at accurately defining the targets of the whole analysis. The process starts
with the accidents’ identification for the investigated system. Based on the identified accidents, the
relevant hazards are subsequently identified. Hazards in the STPA framework are understood as ‘the
system states or the set of conditions that together with a worst-case set of environmental conditions
will lead to an accident’ [49]. The hazard identification can be implemented either with the assistance
of a hazard review by an individual or an expert teams’ brainstorming. According to the STPA
framework, only the hazards related to the accident under consideration are taken into account, which
can be further broken down in sub-hazards [49]. Based on these hazards and sub-hazards, the safety
constraints and requirements of the system design are identified. The list of existing control measures
is used to augment the ESI implementation as explained in the next step.
Step 2 (Figure 1) focuses on the development of the investigated system hierarchical control
structure, which is one of the differentiating points of the STPA analysis compared with the other
methods [49]. As shown in Figure 2, the process commences with a high-level system abstraction and
proceeds to a more detailed level. The initial control structure consists of the high-level controller, the
human operator and the controlled process with its basic control, feedback and communication links.
A more detailed description incorporates the controllers’ hierarchies. The final refined control structure
includes the information on responsibilities of each controller, the process model with the process
variables and their ranges, the control actions, the actuators’ behaviour, the information provided
by sensors and the interactions between the controllers. The development of a hierarchical control
structure is influenced by the system identifying accidents and hazards. The analysis output from this
step is expected to be in the form shown on the right-hand side of Figure 2.
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The previous steps are the STPA initial steps. The actual hazard identification process starts in
step 3 as shown in Figure 1, having as an objective to identify the Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) that
lead to hazards. The possible UCAs are categorised into the following four types [49]:
• Type 1: Not providing the control action that leads to a hazard.
• Type 2: Providing a control action that leads to a hazard.
• Type 3: A control action is untimely provided (too late, too early or out of sequence).
• Type 4: A control action duration is not adequate (stopped too soon or applied for too long).
In addition, there is also the following UCA type: “a safe control action is provided but not
followed”; however, this is considered equivalent to the Type 1 UCAs [49]. This type of failure mode is
analysed during the identification of causal factors in the next paragraph.
For each control action, the potential process variables values are considered, and it is investigated
whether the control action will lead to a hazard/sub hazard or not. Similarly, with the system hazard
identification, safety constraints can be derived from the UCAs, aiding the identification of appropriate
hazard control measures.
Step 4 includes the causal factors’ identification and forms an essential step for the STPA (Figure 1)
as the causal factors explain why an UCA can occur. In this study, the process was augmented by
the usage of a modified tree structure proposed in Blandine [50], which was enhanced by a list of
causal factors from [51], and it is shown in Figure 3. This allows for the easy transition from the STPA
results into a Fault Tree structure, as in this way the causal factors can be connected to the UCAs by
using the OR gate of a Fault Tree. The UCAs are considered undeveloped events, and their causal
factors are connected to these UCAs using OR gates. Practically, this step is very similar to the checklist
procedures. The list of typical generic causal factors is given in Appendix A. Such a provision of this
checklist is beneficial, as it supports the repeatability and objectiveness of the STPA results. In this
study, the term “scenario” is not used according to STPA framework; instead, scenario is considered in
a much wider context, as, for example, a generic hazardous scenario.
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2.3. ESI (Step 5)
The Events Sequence Identification (ESI) commences after the STPA results have been derived
(Figure 1). The methodology employed in the ESI is very similar to Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [46] and
all the tools relevant to ETA are also used herein to ensure the identified scenarios completeness and to
capture potential sequences of events in the investigated system. Each sub hazard/hazard is used as an
initiating event and the propagation of sub hazards/hazards into a hazard or an accident is investigated
by considering: (a) the protective barriers designed to mitigate the sub hazards/hazards consequences;
(b) the relevant system states; and (c) the identified UCAs from the previous step. The ‘Event Trees’
are considered fully developed when all the outcomes end at either the safe condition, another sub
hazard/hazard, or the investigated hazard/accident. It was assumed that the events’ duration has
no effect on the identified event sequences, but it affects the probability of each selected branch and
consequently the specific states’ calculation (described in Section 2.6).
Despite the similarities between the ESI and the ETA, the following differences exist (justifying
the method name): (a) the ESI analysis is completely internal to the system compared to the ETA,
which can be external to the investigated system; (b) the ESI does not incorporate the calculation of the
protective barriers’ failure probability, and it is implemented only qualitatively; (c) the ESI outcome is
not necessarily an accident but can be a hazard at the system level (the ESI corresponds to the left side
of the classical Bow Tie, in comparison to the ETA that corresponds to the part on the right of the bow
tie); (d) hence, no estimation of risk is provided by the ESI; (e) the ESI along with the STPA results are
used to develop a Fault Tree as described in the next section. It must be noted that the introduction of
the ESI term was followed for distinguishing between the two methods (ESI and ETA).
2.4. STPA and ESI Results’ Integration (Steps 6–8)
Since not all sub hazards/hazards lead directly to the system hazard/accident and some interactions
exist between the various sub hazards/hazards, the developed “Event Trees” are restructured in step
6 of the proposed method (Figure 1), so that the investigated sub hazards/hazards’ propagation is
identified. Subsequently, the ESIs are transformed into a Fault Tree by connecting the events in a
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hazardous sequence using AND gates as shown in Figure 4 using exemplificatory “Event Trees”. The
different scenarios resulting in the same hazard/accident are connected using the OR gates (Figure 4).
The paths from a sub hazard/hazard to another sub hazard/hazard are connected using OR gates
(Figure 4). As a result, a preliminary Fault Tree is developed, which is enriched and refined in the
next steps of the proposed method. This is an important difference between the proposed approach
for employing the ESIs’ “ETs” to develop an FT and the typical approach, according to which FTA is
used to model the causes identified in ETA. In this way, accident becomes a top event in the Fault Tree,
which is rather uncommon. However, accidents/hazards were used as the Fault Tree top events or
nodes in BBN in the pertinent literature, as reported in [32,52]. ISO 31010 allows for using a broader
outcome of a specific failure as the top event [46].
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Figure 4. “Event Trees” transformation into a Fault Tree.
In step 7 (Figure 1), the preliminary Fault Tree is enriched by using the derived STPA results. This
is implemented in two stages. First, the UCAs are related to the branches in the ESI “Event Trees” (and,
consequently, the events of the preliminary Fault Tree). These UCAs are connected to the event in a
Fault Tree using an OR gate. Subsequently, for each UCA, the causal factors are developed under the
UCAs with an OR gate. An example for the implementation of this step is shown in Figure 5 using
exemplificatory UCAs for accident (scenario 2).
Safety 2020, 6, 26 10 of 31
2020, 7, x FOR PEER REVIEW 11 of 30 
 
in a Fault Tree using an OR gate. Subsequently, for each UCA, the causal factors are developed under 
the UCAs with an OR gate. An example for the implementation of this step is shown in Figure 5 using 
ex mplificatory UCAs for accident (scenario 2). 
 
Figure 5. Populating the Fault Tree with UCAs and causal factors. 
The Fault Tree developed in step 7 is not accomplished by populating the Fault Tree with the 
UCAs and the causal factors as inconsistencies may arise due to the fact that the results from the two 
different methods are merged into one structure. Therefore, the developed Fault Tree further 
refinement takes place in Step 8 (Figure 1). This step also takes into account the system architecture 
and the common causal factors. The conditions and applied actions for the FT refinement are 
described in Table 2. These conditions were identified from method application to other systems, as 
it is reported for example in [48]. An applied refinement example is provided in Figure 6, where UCA 
1 is split into the UCA 1 representing its causal factors and the system state (in which UCA 1 occurs); 
UCA2 is split into UCA 2 representing its causal factors and the system fault (with which it occurs), 
whereas the common causal factor for UCA 3 and UCA 4 is ‘upgraded’ to a higher level in Fault Tree 
(the same level as other UCAs). The refinement is required to ensure that the OR and AND gates’ 
calculation involves non repeated and independent events. Special refinement is applied when a 
UCA is connected by using OR gates or AND gates. In the former case (UCA connected using OR 
gates), the common causal factor is propagated to the UCA level, whereas, in the latter case (UCA 
connected using AND gates), the common causal factor is propagated even to a higher level in the 
Fault Tree moving from the basic events to the top event. This special refinement for the integration 
of the methods is an important novel aspect of this method. 
Figure 5. Populating the Fault Tree with UCAs and causal factors.
The Fault Tree developed in step 7 is not accomplished by populating the Fault Tree with the
UCAs and the causal factors as inconsistencies may arise due to the fact that the results from the
two different methods are merged into one structure. Therefore, the developed Fault Tree further
refinement takes place in Step 8 (Figure 1). This step also takes into account the system architecture
and the common causal factors. The conditions and applied actions for the FT refinement are described
in Table 2. These conditions were identified from method application to other systems, as it is reported
for example in [48]. An applied refinement example is provided in Figure 6, where UCA 1 is split into
the UCA 1 representing its causal factors and the system state (in which UCA 1 occurs); UCA2 is split
into UCA 2 representing its causal factors and the system fault (with which it occurs), whereas the
common causal factor for UCA 3 and UCA 4 is ‘upgraded’ to a higher level in Fault Tree (the same level
as other UCAs). The refinement is required to ensure that the OR and AND gates’ calculation involves
non repeated and independent events. Special refinement is applied when a UCA is connected by
using OR gates or AND gates. In the former case (UCA connected using OR gates), the common causal
factor is propagated to the UCA level, whereas, in the latter case (UCA connected using AND gates),
the common causal factor is propagated even to a higher level in the Fault Tree moving from the basic
events to the top event. This special refinement for the integration of the methods is an important
novel aspect of this method.
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Table 2. Conditions for the FT refinement and refinement actions.
Rule Number Condition Refinement Action
1
An UCA is hazardous in a specific
context and this is not captured by the
ESI “Event Tree”
An UCA is split into control action and the
context variable, representing context
connected using AND gate
2 An UCA is a causal factor of anotherUCA
Grouping is applied, the UCA is connected
to the other one using OR gate
3
UCAs have identical causal factors and
are located in the same position of the
ESI “Event Tree”/Fault Tree
Merging of these UCAs is applied
4
A common causal factor for the UCAs at
different points of “Event Tree”/Fault
Tree
Causal factors are promoted to a higher
level of the Fault Tree
5 A contradiction in a sequence of eventsoccurs Elimination of the contradictory events
6
An UCA is caused by a complex
physical failure, which is refined by a
Fault Tree
Subcases are defined for each physical
failure
7 Common cause failures leading tocomplex physical failure
Subcase is defined for the common cause
failure in Fault Tree2020, 7, x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 30 
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2.5. FTA (Step 9)
According to the STPA results, some of the hazardous situations are related to a combination
of a control action and a system state, which in turn is caused by a physical failure. For the cases
where this system state is attributed to a number of a subsystem physical components failures, FTA is
employed to identify these components’ failures (Figure 1). The top event in the FTA is taken as the
system state from the relevant UCA (a high level physical failure) and the causes are identified by: (a)
breaking down the subsystem into components; (b) assessing which component failure will lead to the
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top event of the local FTA, and; (c) considering the functional dependencies between the identified
components. The identification of components failures leading to the top failure can be supported by
considering the conditions under which the safety functions in specific components are activated. This
step requires much more detailed information about the investigated subsystem and its components
dependencies, as well as the subsystem components’ specific failures. The different components’
failures are connected using OR gates. If the same components are connected in parallel, their failures
are connected to other failures using AND gates. If some of the components have identical standby
components, then these components failures are connected using OR gates, but special treatment is
provided for estimating its probability of failure as described in the next section. The developed Fault
Tree in this step is connected to the previous steps Fault Tree (as shown in Figure 6), resulting in a more
detailed Fault Tree, linked to the investigated system components’ failures, which can be used for the
purposes of the Quantitative Analysis (QA) described in the next section.
2.6. Quantitative Analysis (Step 10)
The purpose of the QA is to support the decision-making process and the safer systems
design [22,53]. The approach followed in this study is probabilistic based and the QA output
includes the calculation of top event failure rate
(
λTE
)
. The λTE due to its linear connection to the
frequency of events, which is used as a risk metric [54]. The top event failure rate is considered to
be a more representative metric, as it corresponds to the investigated event and, therefore, historical
data for its frequency can be retrieved through the number of the reported accidents. In this respect,
ambiguous and computationally expensive calculations of the top event frequency (for example, by
employing Markov chains) can be avoided. In addition, this step includes a importance analysis to
identify the system critical failures.
The following assumptions were made for the QA purposes:
• The basic events in the Fault Tree can be grouped to three categories: (a) the operating system
components failures (poci ); (b) the safety systems failures (p
ss
i ) (it must be noted that the safety
systems function is to control and handle the operating system components failures); and (c)
specific system states, for example overloading of the generation sets (psssi ).
• The considered systems components’ failure rates follow an Exponential failure
probability distribution.
• The inspection of the system components is performed according to the manufacturers’ guidelines
and can effectively detect the system components’ condition including their failures and
degradation level.
• The implemented maintenance practice for the systems components is according to the manufacture
guidelines and restores the system components to the best possible condition (repairing their
detected faults and mitigating their degradation). The maintenance intervals of the system
components are considered to be timely as proposed by the respective manufacturers.
• The duration of testing and duration of repairs of faults detected during testing have negligible
impact on the availability of the standby components or the components implementing
safety functions.
• The top event probability differential can be adequately approximated by employing the respective
difference considering a relatively small time interval, which was taken as 1 h.
The failure rate for the top event λTE is estimated using the following approximation based on the
failure rate definition [55]:
λTE =
P[ f ailure occurs between t and t+ dt
∣∣∣no prior f ailure]
dt
=
dPTE
dt
≈ ∆PTE
∆t
, ∆t = 1hour (1)
where PTE denotes the top event probability, which is derived from the Fault Tree (from Step 9) (an
example is shown in Figure 6) by applying the specific calculation rules for the Fault Tree gates.
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The following equation is employed to calculate the probability outcome of an OR gate with z
input events (Ez) [56]:
P = 1− P
[
E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 ∩ . . . ∩ Ez
]
=
∑n
k=1 P(Ek) −
∑
k<l P(Ek ∩ El) + . . .+ (−1)z−1P(E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 ∩ . . .∩ Ez)
(2)
The following equation is employed to calculate the probability outcome of an AND gate with z
input events (Ez) [56]:
P = P(E1)P(E2) . . .P(Ez) (3)
The equations used for the calculation of the basic events probability P
(
E j
)
(for the basic event
E j of the Fault Tree), which were derived considering the event type and the assumptions presented
previously, are provided below. The required input parameters include the number of the redundant
components, the components’ maintenance and testing intervals (Ti), the maintenance repair rates
(µi), the components failure rates (λi), and the probability of failure on demand for the software
components (PFDi).
For software, hardware, communication, and sensors’ failures (based on [55,56]):
pOCi, j = λit (4)
For tested cold standby equipment failure on demand (except for software failures) (based
on [55,56]):
pSSi, j = 1+
(
e−λiTi − 1
)
λiTi
(5)
For safety system/functions with continuous monitoring failure on demand (based on [55,56]):
pSSi, j =
λi
λi + µi
(
1− e−(λi+µi)Ti
)
(6)
For software failures in safety functions (based on [55,56]):
pSSi, j = PFDi (7)
The Birnbaum’s importance measure (IBj ) [56], which is approximated according to Equation (8), is
employed for the basic events importance analysis. This metric can be used to identify the components
with a significant impact on the top event failure rate
(
λTE
)
. In such cases, an improvement of the
respective failure rates/probability can result in reducing the λTE. In addition, this metric can be used
to identify components having a structural importance or occupying important locations of the Fault
Tree for the investigated system [57]. It depends on the quality of the developed Fault Tree, which is
used for the calculation of the top event failure rate:
IBj =
∂pTE(λi)
∂p j

∂λTE(λi)
∂p j
∂t ≈ ∆λ
TE(λi)
∆p j
∆t ≈ λ
TE(λi) − λTE(λi = 0)
p j
∆t , ∆t = 1 hour (8)
The Fussell–Vesely importance measure (IFVj ), which is approximated according to Equation (9),
is another metric that is employed in this study for facilitating the system importance analysis [56–58].
Based on this metric, the system components, the failure of which will most probably lead to the
undesired event are identified [59]:
IFVj =
∂pTE(λi)
∂p j
p j
pTE
(
p j
)  ∂λTE(λi)
∂p j
p j
λTE
(
p j
) ≈ ∆λTE(λi)
∆p j
p j
λTE
(
p j
) ≈ λTE(p j)− λTE(p j = 0)
λTE
(
p j
) (9)
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3. System Description and Analysis Input
For the application and demonstration of the proposed method, a rather simple industrial control
system (ICS) has been selected, in particular, an open loop exhaust gas scrubber system. This can be
considered as a simple example of CPSs, as it consists of a Programmable Logic Controller, the relevant
actuators and physical components (pumps, scrubber unit, valves, etc.), and sensors for controlling the
cleaning of exhaust gases.
The main purpose of the exhaust gas scrubber is to reduce the SOx emissions from the exhaust
gas of the ship main engine and auxiliary engines when operating by burning High Sulphur Heavy
Fuel Oil (HSHFO). The exhaust gases coming from the ship main and auxiliary engines are sprayed by
injecting sea water within the scrubber. The sea water has a slightly higher pH (8) and, therefore, it
will react with the SOx dissolved in the injected sea water. The main components of the open loop
exhaust gas scrubber system are demonstrated in Figure 7 [60].
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The main functions of the open l exhaust gas scrubber system components are provided in
Table 3. The exhaust gas scrubber control system can shut down the scrubber operations by closing the
valves and switching off the sea water pumps. It also regulates the sea water flow rate and operating
status of the sea water pumps based on the estimation of the fuel flow of the ship main and auxiliary
engines. The process is supervised by the crew, which can implement switching over to a fuel with a
low sulphur content if the exhaust gas SOx emissions exceed the acceptable limits. As an optional
functionality, the exhaust gas scrubber control system could monitor the health status of the scrubber
unit and predict its failures. In such a case, it is assumed that all the scrubber unit failures can be
handled by the ship crew by switching over to a low Sulphur fuel. For the sake of the case study, it is
considered that the scrubber unit failures as well as the SOx emissions sensor are not monitored by
the alarm monitoring system, so the crew is not aware of the specific failures in order to switch off
the scrubber system. It is also assumed that the crew can only mitigate the system hazards, but do
not introduce the new hazards, so the crew cannot inadvertently switch off the exhaust gas scrubber
system when the ship engines operate using HFO.
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Table 3. Exhaust gas open loop scrubber system main components and their functions.
Component Function
Scrubber controller
Control of the sea water flow to the scrubber unit,
monitoring of scrubber unit health status (provisional
function)
Inlet sea chest valve Sea water flow control (can be either open or closed)
Outlet sea chest valve Sea water flow control (can be either open or closed)
Sea Water Pump Increasing/Decreasing sea water flow
Scrubber Unit
(Scrubber body, piping, droplet, venturi, injection
nozzles)
Exhaust gases spraying
Sensors (SOx emissions, pressure, pH, conductivity,
CO2 emissions)
Measuring operating parameters
The failure rates used as input for this analysis and their sources are provided in Table 4. The
inspection and testing of the SOx sensor and the standby pump are considered to be implemented
every 5000 h, in line with the system maintenance manual [61].
Table 4. Data used as input.
Failure Rate Description PFD/Failure Rate
Commission errors for software functions [h−1] [62] 1.00 × 10−5
Omission errors for software functions (probability of failure on demand (PFD)) [62] 5.00 × 10−5
Proportional Integral Derivative (PID) controller failure to react/overreaction to
changes in system configuration due to software errors [h−1] [63] 1.00 × 10−6
Controller hardware failure rate [h−1] [62] 1.50 × 10−5
Communication lines failure rate [h−1] [64] 2.50 × 10−8
Fuel sensor failure rate (for engines and auxiliary generating sets) [h−1] [65] 2.00 × 10−6
Human error probability of failure on demand [66] 1.00 × 10−3
Pump failure rate [h−1] [65] 3.02 × 10−5
Injection nozzles failure rate [h−1] [42,43] 4.58 × 10−6
Venturi failure rate [h−1] [42,43] 1.53 × 10−6
Droplet separator failure rate [h−1] [42,43] 1.53 × 10−6
Body failure rate [h−1] [42,43] 1.53 × 10−6
Piping failure rate [h−1] [42,43] 7.88 × 10−6
Significant power increase in engine/auxiliary engines load [h−1]
Approximation of operating profile, based on cruise ship vessel [67] 1.00 × 10
−1
SOx sensor failure rate [h−1] [42] 1.38 × 10−5
Pressure sensors failure rate [65] [h−1] 2.00 × 10−6
Sensors maintenance rate—Assumption [h−1]—it considered that, under
continuous monitoring of sensor failures, their correction is implemented almost
immediately
1
Inconsistent diagnostic/prognostics model resulting in false negatives (test indicates
that no failure is observed in the system whilst it is present)—Assumption (PFD)
Rather conservative
0.1
The analysis in this study investigated the exhaust gas open loop system shown in Figure 7
considering the following functionalities and alternative configurations: (a) regular testing of the SOx
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emissions sensor (without continuous monitoring); (b) continuous monitoring of the SOx emissions
sensor (the SOx emissions sensor failure/erroneous measurements are immediately identified using
advanced diagnostic techniques); (c) when scrubber unit failures (Scrubber body, piping, droplet,
venturi, injection nozzles) are monitored using diagnostic/prognostic techniques and immediately
diagnosed; and (d) with two installed SOx emissions’ sensors.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. STPA Results (Steps 1–4)
A number of accidents and hazardous scenarios that can arise in the investigated exhaust gas
scrubber system are provided in Table 5 (results of step 1) (derived based on previous studies [42,43] and
own analysis). As it can be observed, despite the fact that the system is simple and non-safety-critical,
a number of accidents and hazards can occur, which may result in human injury or death, as well
as damage to equipment or environment. The analysis in the CASA method subsequent steps will
focus on the environmental pollution [A-3] and specifically on [H-5] (Exhaust gas not complying with
regulatory requirements.), as this study scope is to demonstrate the functionality of the CASA method.
As elaborated in Sections 1 and 3, the proper spraying of exhaust gas is an important scrubber function
and its failure may result in environmental pollution and strict financial penalties. The hazard [H-5] is
used for the development of the hierarchical control structure (step 2) and the identification of the
UCAs (step 3).
Table 5. Accidents in the scrubber system.
Accident Exhaust Gas Open LoopScrubber Hazard Safety Constraints
[A-1] Human loss or injury
[H-1] Operating personnel
touching hot surfaces
[H-2] Exhaust gases leakage
depriving the engine room from
oxygen
Protective surfaces, personnel
training, oxygen level monitoring
in engine room
[A-2] Damage to ship/ship systems
[H-3] Overpressure in scrubber
unit
[H-4] Water ingression through
scrubber system
Diagnosis of system failures
Use of non-return valves
[A-3] Environmental pollution
[H-5] Exhaust gas not complying
with regulatory requirements.
[H-6] Disposed sea water not
complying with regulations.
SOx sensor
Sea water analysers
The system control structure (results of step 2) is provided in Figure 8. It can be observed that the
control loop incorporates two controllers, the scrubber control system and the human operator. The
scrubber controller uses as input the ship engines fuel flow to control the pumps’ operating status, the
sea water flow and the control valves’ status. The crew can implement the fuel change command and
switch off the scrubber, in cases where the measured SOx emissions exceed the regulatory threshold.
In cases where a provisional functionality is available in the scrubber controller for monitoring the
scrubber body failures based on pressure measurements, then the crew can immediately implement the
fuel change to a low Sulphur fuel, when scrubber body failure occurs. Measuring the discharged sea
water pH is also an important measure to ensure that the discharged sea water is in compliance with
the environmental regulations. However, since this measure is not relevant to [H-5], it is not included
in the hierarchical control system. The hierarchical control structure is used for the identification of the
UCAs (step 3) and their causal factors (step 4).
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The list of identified Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) is provided in Table 6 (results of step 3).
In total, 10 UCAs were identified for the system hazard [H-5]. The 10th identified UCA is applicable
only if a new functionality performing the exhaust gas scrubber unit health diagnosis/prognosis is
employed (case c as described in Section 3). The identified UCAs are found to be of Type 1 (not
provided), Type 2 (provided), or Type 3 (provided too early/late/out of sequence). This is attributed to
the fact that mostly discrete control actions, such as start, open, or close are considered. Thus, Type
4 UCA (stopped too soon/applied for too long) for many of the identified UCAs can be considered
as equivalent to Type 1 UCAs; for example, a start pump stopped too soon would be equivalent to
not providing a control action (not starting the pump) in its final effect, leading to the specific hazard.
Type 4 UCA, instead, is more applicable if the control action exhibits some variation in its effect, as
in the case of the PID controllers, where overshoots can occur. However, in this particular case, they
are either covered by other UCA Type or do not lead to the investigated hazard. Based on the UCAs
shown in Table 7, their causal factors are identified (step 4). The UCAs are also used to support the
’Event Trees’ development (step 5) as well as in step 7 to enrich the Fault Tree developed in step 6. The
UCAs are also utilised to indicate which physical failures might need further elaboration in step 9.
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Table 6. Identified UCAs.
Control Action Type of UCA UCA No. Description
Close valves Providing 1
Closing valves during normal
operation/faulty conditions will restrict
the scrubber functionality [H-5]
Start pump
Not providing 2
Not starting standby sea water pump
when other pump is faulty/insufficient
will inhibit the scrubber operation due to
lack of sea water flow [H-5]
Providing with delay 3
Starting sea water pumps with delay will
inhibit the scrubber operation due to the
lack of sea water flow [H-5]
Stop pump Providing 4
Stopping pump during normal operation
will cause unavailability of sea water in
scrubber [H-5]
Increase sea water
flow
Not providing 5
Not providing sea water flow increase
when the auxiliary/engines output
increase may lead to noncompliance with
regulations [H-5]
Providing with delay 6
Providing sea water flow increase with
delay when the auxiliary/engines output
increase may lead to noncompliance with
regulations [H-5]
Decrease sea water
flow Providing 7
Decreasing sea water flow when the
auxiliary/engines output increase/stable
may lead to noncompliance with
regulations [H-5]
Issue alarm Not providing 8
Not issuing alarm, when the system SOx
emissions are not in compliance will lead
to noncompliance with regulations [H-5]
Implement fuel
change over Not providing 9
Not changing fuel during faulty
operation of the scrubber will lead to
noncompliance with regulations [H-5]
Diagnose and predict
scrubber failures Not providing 10
Not diagnosing and predicting failures in
scrubber may lead to operation with
faulty scrubber system [H-5]
The causal factors list for the identified UCAs is provided in Table 7 (step 4). In total, 26 causal
factors are identified. For the majority of the UCAs, software failures are considered as causal factors.
In this study, software failure refers to all those conditions, which may lead to the controller inability to
implement a specific function due to errors in the software design, integer overflows, software bugs,
communication errors in the controller, etc. They are treated as software failure because the available
statistical data does not offer their further description. The human error depicts the failure of the
human operator to act as a protective barrier. The human error was also treated on a high-level based
on the relevant statistical data reported in IEC 61511 [66]. The identification of human failure causes
is out of the scope of this research. The results of this step are used in step 7 to enrich the Fault Tree
developed in step 6.
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Table 7. Causal factors.
UCA No. Causal Factors
1 Software failure, engine and auxiliary generator sets fuel sensors failure
2 Pump failure, controller hardware failure, communication failure, software failure,controller hardware failure
3 Software failure (Wrong software implementation on controller)
4 Software failure, engine and auxiliary gets load/fuel sensors erroneous measurement
5 Software failure, controller hardware failure, communication failure, engine and auxiliarygets fuel sensors erroneous measurement
6 Software failure
7 Software failure, engine and auxiliary generator sets load sensors erroneous measurement
8 SOx sensor failure
9 Human error
10 Software failure, inconsistent physical model, pressure sensor errors
4.2. ESI Results (Step 5)
The “Event Tree” derived by applying the ESI for the hazard [H-5] is provided in Figure 9, which
also depicts the relations between the UCAs and the different events of “Event Tree”. As it is deduced
from this figure, the UCAs support the development of the “Event Tree”. When the exhaust gas system
operation does not comply with the emission regulations ([H-5]), the SOx emissions sensor provides an
alarm. This can be used from the crew to switch the engine operation to the low sulphur fuel usage and
simultaneously to switch off the scrubber system. If crew fails to do that, the first hazardous scenario
occurs. If the SOx sensor is faulty, then the crew will be unaware of potential noncompliance with the
emissions’ regulations (scenario 2). The developed “Event Tree” will be converted to a Fault Tree in the
next step (step 6).
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4.3. STPA and ESI Results Integration (Steps 6–8), FTA Results (Step 9)
Since the investigated system is simple, there are no interactions between the different developed
“Event Trees”. By transforming the “Event Tree” (Figure 9) (step 6) and enriching it with the results of
STPA (step 7), Fault Tree shown in Figure 10 is generated. As the caus l factors are given in Table 7,
thes causal factors wer not developed further in Figure 10. The dev loped Fault Tre in ludes he
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two scenarios leading to environmental pollution, inheriting the structure of the “Event Tree” from
Figure 9. This Fault Tree is refined further in step 8.
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If we ignore steps (5–6), the Fault would be developed by connecting all the UCAs by OR gate.
In the hypothetical case, all the UCAs (UCAs 1–10) were connected using the OR gate, then either
‘Closing valves during normal operation/faulty conditions will restrict the scrubber functionality [H-5]’
(UCA 1) or ‘Not changing fuel during faulty operation of the scrubber [H-5]’ (UCA10) would lead to
the hazard [H-5], which is noncompliance with regulations. However, it is known from experience
that these two UCAs must occur at the same time (there is a need for AND gate). Potentially, it would
be possible to identify this relationship using the safety analyst experience. Nonetheless, using the ESI
adds rigor to the analysis; hence, ESI was included in the CASA method.
After applying the refinement rules provided in Table 2 (step 8), the Fault Tree shown in Figure 11
is developed. As shown in Figure 11, the refinement was applied to UCAs 1–3 and 5–7 context
(refinement rule 1, Table 2) and for the common causal factors to UCA 5 and 7 (erroneous measurement
of fuel flow) (refinement rule 4, Table 2). The system is rather simple; hence, no other refinements
were required. In more complex systems, such as the system analysed in [48], more refinement rules
would be applicable. The Fault Tree of step 8 is enriched with the results of FTA for physical failures,
thus providing the finally developed Fault Tree (shown in Figure 10), which is the output of the
CASA method qualitative analysis. The FTA (step 9) is applied to the scrubber system to identify the
components that may fail. Only five scrubber unit components have been considered in the analysis.
The results of the FTA are also provided in Figure 11. The results of FTA are similar to the structural
breakdown of the scrubber unit. The final Fault Tree depicted in Figure 11 is used for the purpose of
quantitative analysis (step 10). The results for the cases a–d are almost identical. There is no difference
in structure for cases a and b. The location of the optional functionality for case (c) is also provided in
the modified Fault Tree in Figure 11. For case (d), instead of one sensor, two sensors are provided.
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4.4. Quantitative Analysis (Step 10)
The results of estimating the top event failure rate by considering the different system functionalities
(cases (a) to (d) as described in Section 3) are provided in Table 8.
Table 8. Top event failure rate for different system functionalities.
Case (a) Case (b) Case (c) Case (d)
With regular testing of
SOx sensor (without
continuous monitoring)
With continuous
monitoring of SOx
sensor failures
With application of
diagnosis/prognosis for
scrubber unit failures
and with regular testing
of SOx sensor
With two SOx sensors
installed
1.99 10−6 [h−1] 5.68 10−8 [h−1] 1.44 10−6 [h−1] 1.23 10−7
The results of the importance analysis (cases (a) to (d) as described in Section 3) are provided in
Table 9. Only the five top failures according to each metric and system functionalities are demonstrated.
The results of importance analysis are presented in a reduced ranking order, proceeding from the most
critical to the least critical failures according to each importance measure.
Table 9. Importance analysis results.
No.
With Regular Testing of SOx
Sensor (without Continuous
Monitoring)
With Continuous Monitoring
of SOx Sensor Failures
With Application of
Diagnosis/Prognosis for
Scrubber Unit Failures and with
Regular Testing of the SOx
Sensor
With Two SOx Sensors Installed
Birnbaum [-] Fussell–Vesely[-] Birnbaum [-]
Fussell–Vesely
[-] Birnbaum [-] Fussell–Vesely [-] Birnbaum [-] Fussell–Vesely [-]
1
Injection
nozzles
failure 0.070
SOx sensor
failure 0.972
Injection
nozzles
failure 0.002
Human error
0.986
Injection
nozzles
failure 0.039
SOx sensor failure
0.972
Injection
nozzles
failure 0.004
SOx sensor failure
0.543
2 Venturifailure 0.070
Controller
software closing
valves 0.178
Venturi
failure 0.002
Controller
software closing
valves 0.178
Venturi
failure 0.039
Controller
software closing
valves 0.247
Venturi
failure 0.004 Human error 0.457
3
Controller
software
closing
valves 0.035
Controller
software
stopping pump
0.178
Controller
software
closing
valves 0.001
Controller
software
stopping pump
0.178
Controller
software
closing
valves 0.035
Controller
software stopping
pump 0.247
Controller
software
closing
valves 0.002
Controller
software closing
valves 0.178
4
Controller
software
stopping
pump 0.035
Injection nozzles
failure 0.163
Controller
software
stopping
pump 0.001
Piping failure
0.140
Controller
software
stopping
pump 0.035
Injection nozzles
failure 0.124
Controller
software
stopping
pump 0.002
Controller
software stopping
pump 0.178
5 Pipingfailure 0.035
Piping failure
0.140
Piping
failure 0.001
Venturi failure
0.054
Auxiliary
engine fuel
sensor
failure 0.035
Auxiliary engine
fuel sensor failure
0.074
Piping
failure 0.002
Injection nozzles
failure 0.163
As it can be deduced from the derived Birnbaum metric values for case a, the top event failure
is sensitive to the scrubber components failures and various software failures in the system with
the regular SOx sensor testing (case a). The top event failure rate will emanate from the SOx sensor
failure and some scrubber unit failures as well as the scrubber controller software failure according to
Fussell–Vesely metric for case a. Therefore, the system safety performance can be improved if safety
measures to address the SOx emissions sensor failure are implemented.
As it can be observed from Table 8, the implementation of continuous monitoring and diagnosis of
the SOx sensor failures (case b) instead of regular testing of SOx sensor will lead to significant decrease
in top event failure (several orders of magnitude). However, the human error becomes a more critical
failure according to the calculated Fussell–Vesely metric (Table 9). The scrubber and controller failures
still remain critical failures with this additional system function. Therefore, to enhance the system
safety performance further, it is required to provide information for the system conditions to support
the crew in making decisions.
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Instead, the application of diagnosis/prognosis techniques for the scrubber failure leads to
approximately 27% reduction in the top event failure rate as depicted in Table 8 (case c). In case c, the
system top failure rate also becomes sensitive to failures of the sensors used to control the sea water
flow (Table 9). The most probable cause of the system failure according to the Fussell–Vesely metric
remains the SOx sensor failure and various scrubber components’ failures (Table 9). Thus, with this
system functionality, system safety enhancement will occur when redundancy to the SOx emissions
sensor measurements is provided.
Installation of two SOx sensors (instead of one) also results in a significant reduction of the top
event failure rate (an order of magnitude) (Table 8). In case d, the failure of the SOx sensors (both fail)
still remain critical, but their criticality is reduced compared to the case with the regular SOx sensor
failure (Table 9). The other importance analysis results are similar to the previous cases importance
analysis results. Thus, the system safety in case c can be enhanced by closely monitoring the scrubber
unit components for detecting failures.
Based on the presented results, it can be concluded that the exhaust gas open loop scrubber
system compliance with the SOx emission regulations can be enhanced when functionality of the SOx
emissions sensor is continuously monitored or two SOx emissions sensors (redundancy) are installed.
The scrubber unit components’ failures seem to be critical for the normal system operation. The
installation of diagnosis/prognosis technologies will lead to the system design improvement, however
not as effectively as the installation of continuous monitoring system for the SOx sensor failures or an
additional SOx emissions’ sensor. If diagnosis/prognosis techniques are employed, then the top event
failure rate will become sensitive to other failures such as in fuel flow sensors, so redundancy in fuel
measurements would be recommended. However, the cost-effectiveness of the suggested measures is
outside the scope of present study.
4.5. Discussion on the Method
To the best knowledge of the authors, no article or conference paper providing results from
scrubbers’ safety analyses is currently available. Only two theses (master and bachelor) have been
identified focusing on this type of system safety analysis [42,43]. Comparing these studies’ results
with the results derived in the present study is challenging due to the differences in the considered
systems, the experience level of the involved safety analysts and used input data.
Nevertheless, it can be observed that the considered top events in the systems in these studies [42,43]
are rather slightly different from the top event of the present study. In the present study, the top event
was the noncompliance with the regulations, whilst in the investigated master theses one of the Fault
Trees top events was improper treatment of exhaust gases (Figure 11). However, it can be observed
that the Fault Tree derived by the CASA method incorporated the SOx emissions’ sensor failure at a
much higher level connected to other events using an AND gate, highlighting its criticality. In the other
studies Fault Trees [42,43], the SOx sensor failure was not included. Therefore, the present analysis
considered more failures related to the top event. This can be attributed to the inclusion of the STPA
and ESI results. STPA is a top-down approach, which guides the analysis of specific undesired events
(called accidents in the STPA framework) and system states (hazards) rather than of system component
failures. The ESI results can be used to demonstrate how the hazards propagate to accidents; the SOx
sensors’ failure appeared in the Fault Tree (Figure 9) based on this approach. Human failure was also
incorporated in the present analysis. However, it was out of the analyses scope reported in [42,43].
In addition, several software failures were not considered in these analyses, whereas they
are considered in the present study, such as ‘scrubber control system not increasing sea water
flow/decreasing sea water flow in the system’ or ‘scrubber control system shutting down the system’.
These need to be included in the analysis, as they contribute to the improper treatment of the exhaust
gases. Based on that, it can be argued that, thanks to incorporation of the STPA results, new scenarios
are considered in the Fault Tree structure. Therefore, it could be claimed that the proposed CASA
Safety 2020, 6, 26 24 of 31
method guides a more accurate safety analysis, which incorporates software failures, addressing the
software-intensive character of the modern ICS and CPSs.
In addition, the refinement, which was applied to the identified UCAs, allowed for the better
consideration of the temporal system behaviour. To be specific, the consideration of probability of UCA
context, such as ‘significant power increase’ allowed for the incorporation of cases where a specific
UCA can become hazardous and their consideration in the analysis quantitative step. This is often a
case for ICS, as specific control actions become hazardous only in specific system context [16].
The structure of the final Fault Tree developed in step 9 of this study is different from the Fault
Trees presented in other studies FTA [42,43], which can be considered as the open-loop scrubber system
breakdown. In addition, they also incorporated the failures during the system start-up. In this way,
failures that can occur at different operating phases without any relation were incorporated in one
Fault Tree [42,43]. This is not true in the actual system operation, as a number of factors must occur
simultaneously or in a sequence, in order for a top event to occur in modern CPSs. In the present study
Fault Tree, there is a logical sequence of events, which is depicted using AND gates as connectors. For
instance, a failure in scrubber system together with the SOx emissions’ sensor failure must occur, so
that the system is noncompliant with the existing SOx regulations. Therefore, it can be argued that the
presented Fault Tree, thanks to the ESI, more effectively considered the system multi-points failures
and temporal character.
The method allowed for the comparison of the system behaviour using quantitate metrics in cases
where advances monitoring/diagnostics functionalities were considered. It was demonstrated that,
when including diagnosis/prognosis techniques or the SOx emissions, sensor failures’ continuous
monitoring settings change the system safety performance significantly, overcoming this STPA
limitation. This can be useful when considering the implementation of new functions in system or
design alternatives during the system design phase.
Based on the above, it is demonstrated that the proposed novel CASA method’s main advantage
is the development of a Fault Tree of greater accuracy in comparison with the Fault Tree that can be
derived using the classical FTA. The classical FTA may result in inaccuracies if applied to a modern
CPS. The CASA method incorporates a wider system context, considers the software failures, thus
addressing the CPSs software-intensive character of CPSs, and incorporates the system temporal
behaviour in the Fault Tree thanks to the inclusion of the ESI approach. The incorporation of the system
temporal aspects is an advantage compared to other studies using FMEA [29], FTA [30,31], Bayesian
Networks [32], and STPA [34–38].
Compared to the STPA, the CASA method included the estimation of the safety and importance
metrics, thus supporting a financial resources’ prioritisation for addressing the system safety
enhancement. The importance metrics estimation is an advantage compared to Petri Nets based
approaches [20,27,28]. As it was demonstrated, in the CASA method, a more detailed system safety
model was developed than STPA based ranking approaches [34–37], which supports more accurate
criticality/importance analysis.
Another advantage of the CASA method is the quantification of the impact on the system
safety of adding advanced software-based functions, which was not demonstrated in STPA based
approaches [34,36–38], and only approximated in [35,38]. This is an advantage compared to a number
of model-based approaches. For instance, a model based approach used for the Fault Tree development
applied to a power system failed to quantify the power reduction functions impact on the system
safety [68]. In this respect, it can be deduced that the quantification of the advanced functionalities
impact on the system safety by using FTA is questionable. Potentially, this would be possible by using
Bayesian Networks or Petri Nets, and this is a topic for future research.
The fact that the method was successfully implemented for the safety analysis of a non-safety
critical ship system demonstrates that it can be applied to other safety critical and non-safety critical
ICS, such as the ship power and propulsion systems, ballast water treatment systems, nuclear control
systems, industrial power systems, heat, ventilation, and air conditioning control system. Forthcoming
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studies could also investigate if the CASA method is effective for the safety analysis of socio-technical
systems and autonomous CPSs.
The increased CASA accuracy, however, comes at a cost. The method has rather a large number of
steps, which indicates that more time is required to apply the method than the STPA or the classical
FTA. This poses a need to automate the application of the method based on formal models. This is also
a topic proposed for future research.
5. Conclusions
In this study, a novel method for safety analysis of the CPSs was developed and demonstrated.
This method combines two hazard identification and analysis techniques and a modified hazard
identification and analysis technique—to be specific, the systemic STPA, the traditional FTA as well as
the ETA-based ESI method. The method commences with STPA to identify potential software failures,
proceeds with system hazardous sequences identification using the ESI, employs the FTA to analyse
further specific system failures and finishes with the Quantitative Analysis to estimate safety and
importance metrics. The novel method was applied for safety analysis of the open-loop exhaust gas
scrubber system.
The main findings of this study are summarised as follows:
• The straightforward application of FTA to CPSs may result in inaccurate representation of the
top event.
• The CASA method guided and resulted in a more accurate safety analysis, compared with previous
FTAs for the same system by incorporating the system software failures represented by UCAs,
considering the system states’ probabilities, multi-point failures, and temporal relationships in
the system.
• The CASA method also allowed for the investigation and quantitative estimation of the system
behaviour for cases where new functions are added to the system, as was demonstrated with the
monitoring techniques applied to the SOx sensor and scrubber unit.
• The proposed method allowed for the estimation of the safety-related event failure rate and the
identification of the most important factors and failures affecting the safety-related event guiding
the safety enhancement of the investigated system.
• The implementation of monitoring techniques for the SOx sensor failures or two SOx sensors’
installation is expected to reduce significantly the system noncompliance failure rate (an order
of magnitude) with regulations. Implementation of advanced monitoring techniques for the
scrubber unit failures is expected to improve system safety, but to a lesser extent.
In summary, this study demonstrated that the developed method for a complex system undesired
event failure rate estimation led to a more effective and complete Fault Tree development in comparison
to the previous studies. The method also allowed for assessing the impact of different parameters to
the overall system undesired event failure rate overcoming the STPA limitations. It is expected that the
proposed method will constitute a valuable tool for the CPS safety analysis during the initial design
phases and support the safe systems operation. A future work could investigate the proposed method
automation based on formal models or application to other systems. Other safety/financial metrics
estimation could also be considered for the exhaust gas open loop scrubber system.
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Abbreviation and Nomenclature
BBN Bayesian Belief Networks
CPS Cyber-Physical System
ESI Events Sequence Identification
ETA Event Tree Analysis
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
HFO Heavy Fuel Oil
ICS Industrial Automation and Control Systems
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PID Proportional Integral Derivative
QA Quantitative Analysis
STPA System-Theoretic Process Analysis
UCA Unsafe Control Action
E j Basic event in Fault Tree
IFVj Fussell–Vesely importance measure
IBj Birnbaum’s importance measure
pOCi, j Probability of failure for operating component
pSSi, j Probability of failure of safety system
pSSSi, j Probability of specific system states
PFDi The probability of failure on demand [-]
Ti Inspection or maintenance interval [hours]
t Time [hours]
Subscripts
i Component
j Basic event in Fault Tree
Greek symbols
λi Failure rate for component [hours−1]
λTE The top event failure rate
µi Repair rate for component [hours−1]
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Appendix A. The Causal Factors for UCAs
Tables A1 and A2 of Appendix A list the generic causal factors that were used during the causal factors’
identification in the 4th step of the CASA method.
Table A1. Causal factors for provided UCAs.
Scenario Description Causal Factors
Inappropriate control input
Missing control input
Inadequately timed control input
Provided wrong control input
Missing output
(Flawed hardware)
Undiagnosed or on-demand hardware failure
Undiagnosed or on-demand power supply failure
Flawed control algorithm
(Flawed software)
Missing rules
Wrong rules
Wrong clock and time schedule
Flawed process model
Missing process variables
Inconsistency of the process model with the system due to system
deterioration
Inconsistency of the process model with the system due to system
modification
Inconsistency of the process model with the system due to
environmental disturbances
Inconsistency of process model with the system due to the improper
representation of mode changes
Flawed process model input
Delays due to measurement delays
Delays due to communication delays
Delays due to inadequate integration with other controllers
Inadequate information transmission due to interferences
Inadequate information transmission due to noise in sensors
Inadequate information transmission due to inaccurate measurements
Inadequate information transmission due to incorrect installation of
sensors
Inadequate information due to communication with other controllers
Missing information transmission due to communication failures
(Hardware open, short circuits, sensor failure and failure in power
supply to sensors, failure of other controllers)
Missing information transmission due to errors in design
(Communication bus errors, intermittent faults, incorrect installation of
sensors, errors in other controllers)
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Table A2. Causal factors for followed UCAs.
Scenario Description Causal Factors
Inappropriate signal transmission
Faulty transmission (Hardware open, short circuit,
interferences)
Communication bus error
Incorrect connection
Inadequately timed
Flawed execution (Faults in the physical process)
No execution, delayed execution, wrong execution
due to actuator failure
No execution, wrong execution due to incorrect
mounting of the actuator
Failure in power supply to actuator
Flawed execution due to inappropriate process input
(missing, wrong, delayed)
Control action not followed by the lower controller
Conflicting control actions Different data available to controllers or priorities arenot appropriately set
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